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INTRODUCTION

The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”2 Thomas Jefferson
famously described the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause, which prohibits the
endorsement of a particular religion by state actors, as erecting “a wall of separation
between church and state.”3 Jefferson also identified the constitutional freedom of
Nicki Bazer is a Partner at Franczek P.C.
Jenny Lee, Ph.D., is a Law Clerk at Franczek P.C.
1 The authors wish to thank J. Todd Faulkner for his valuable suggestions and comments on this article.
2 U.S. Const. amend. I.
3 The Supreme Court has weighed in on the meaning of the Establishment Clause in more detail in a key
case from the 1940s in which the Court applied the Establishment Clause to state law for the first time:
“The establishment of religion clause means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government may
set up a church. Neither can pass laws that aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another. Neither can force a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to
profess a belief or disbelief in any religion . . . Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or
*
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religion as “the most inalienable and sacred of human rights.”4 It is between these two
foundational pillars that public schools find themselves seeking to strike a delicate
balance between protecting against religious incursion in schools while also respecting
the right of individual students and educators to exercise their religion freely. Thus, while
public school employees and students may wear religious clothing and pray individually
before meals during the school day, the Supreme Court has ruled since the 1960s that
employees and students cannot lead others in prayer during school hours and events
when circumstances imply the school’s endorsement of religion.5
For many years, the Supreme Court decisions in this area attempted to identify guideposts
on how to manage this balance given the unique characteristics of the elementary and
secondary school environment, with more weight given to the Establishment Clause. In
the summer of 2022, however, in Kennedy v. Bremerton School District,6 the Supreme
Court dramatically expanded protections for religious expression in public schools, ruling
in favor of a high school football coach who was disciplined by his school district for
praying after games in the center of the field. With this ruling, the Court tipped the
balance decisively away from Establishment Clause protections and towards protections
for the free exercise of religion. In short, the Court’s decision in Kennedy reflects the
majority’s conservative turn on religious issues in the public sphere, reversing decades of
precedent separating church and state in schools.7
The Court’s decision upholding the coach’s right to pray at the 50-yard line after football
games with students and members of the public raises new questions about how public
schools should approach issues pertaining to employee prayer during school hours and
events. The case may have far-reaching consequences involving First Amendment issues
in the realm of public education, potentially restricting the ability of public schools to
regulate the speech and religious expression of their employees.
Part II of this Article will provide an overview of the Supreme Court’s key decisions on
prayer in public schools since the 1960s. These cases set up the framework for the Court’s
discussion of the First Amendment’s Free Exercise and Establishment clauses in
Kennedy, particularly with respect to the issues of coercion, endorsement, employee free
exercise rights, and the public versus private nature of school prayer. Part III will discuss
the history and details of the Kennedy case, summarizing the facts, lower court
proceedings, and the Supreme Court’s decision. Finally, Part IV will discuss the
implications of the Kennedy decision for public schools and provide key takeaways and
best practices for schools in light of Kennedy.

secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of
Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of separation
between Church and State.’” Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing Tp., 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947).
4 Thomas Jefferson, Minutes of University of Virginia Board of Visitors (March 29, 1819),
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/03-14-02-0167.
5 See infra notes 9–42.
6 Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 142 S. Ct. 2407 (2022).
7 The Court also ruled during the same term as Kennedy that a state violated the Free Exercise Clause
when it banned the use of public funds for students who attend private religious schools. Carson v. Makin,
142 S. Ct. 1987 (2022).
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PRE-KENNEDY SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON PRAYER IN
PUBLIC SCHOOLS
A. Establishment Clause Issues

The Kennedy case both follows and challenges a long line of Supreme Court decisions
addressing the issue of prayer in public schools under the First Amendment. During the
1940s, the Supreme Court incorporated the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause and
Free Exercise Clause into the Fourteenth Amendment, applying them to the states.8
Subsequently, the Court began to address numerous First Amendment issues regarding
prayer and other forms of religious practice that were widespread in public schools. In the
landmark case Engel v. Vitale (1962),9 the Court ruled that state and school-sponsored
prayer violated the Establishment Clause, reasoning that students should not be coerced
into religion or subject to religious proselytizing while at school. While later cases would
nuance Engel’s holding and rationale, the Court’s decisions from Engel up until Kennedy
maintained a clear separation between church and state regarding prayer in public
schools.
In Engel, the Court held that school officials could not require an official state prayer to
be recited in public schools at the start of each school day, even when the prayer was
denominationally neutral and students were permitted to stay silent or be excused during
prayer.10 The Court’s holding was highly specific to the facts. In 1958, a New York City
school board voted to enact a measure that required teachers to begin each school day
with a prayer composed by the State Board of Regents. The prayer consisted of 22 words:
“Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings
upon us, our parents, our teachers and our country.”11 Despite the ostensibly nonsectarian
language, a group of parents went before the school board to express their opposition to
the teacher-led prayer. Parent Lawrence Roth declared, “We believe religious training is
the prerogative of the parent, and not the duty of the government.”12 The school board
insisted that the prayer had nothing to do with religion and was in fact tied to patriotic
feeling, and thus any attempt to cancel the prayer was a “premeditated act to undermine
the American heritage.”13
In January 1959, the families of ten students represented by the ACLU filed a lawsuit
against the school district in New York state court, challenging the constitutionality of
both the state law authorizing the school district to direct the use of the Regents’ prayer
in public schools and the district’s regulation ordering the recitation of the prayer in
schools. The New York Court of Appeals sustained the lower court’s order upholding the
power of the state to direct the use of the Regents’ prayer in public schools as long as

Cantwell v. State of Conn., 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962).
10 Id. at 424.
11 Id. at 422.
12 JUSTIN DRIVER, THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE: PUBLIC EDUCATION, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE BATTLE FOR
THE AMERICAN MIND 364 (2018).
13 Id. at 365.
8
9
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schools did not compel students to join in the prayer.14 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed
the state court decisions, holding that the school district’s daily practice of reciting the
Regents’ Prayer violated the Establishment Clause. The Court reasoned that even when a
school allows students to be silent or choose not to participate in nondenominational
prayer, students still feel coercive pressure to conform “when the power, prestige and
financial support of the government is placed behind a particular…officially approved
religion.”15
Later Supreme Court decisions would go beyond Engel’s holding to encompass more
traditional religious expressions of prayer and reinforce concerns pertaining to the
coercion of students. A year after Engel, the Supreme Court decided a similar case in
Abingdon School District v. Schempp (1963),16 in which the Court invalidated state laws
that required teachers to recite the Lord’s Prayer and Bible verses at the start of each
school day. Notably, the Court distinguished the application of the Establishment and
Free Exercise clauses in this case, stating that invalidating teacher-led prayers under the
Establishment Clause was necessary in order to enable the free exercise rights of students
who wished to participate in prayer: “While the Free Exercise Clause clearly prohibits the
use of state action to deny the rights of free exercise to anyone, it has never meant that a
majority could use the machinery of the State to practice [the State’s] beliefs.”17
In another key case on school prayer, the Supreme Court opined that the unconstitutional
coercion of students was possible even in school contexts where attendance was not
technically required. In Lee v. Weisman (1992),18 the Supreme Court ruled that schoolsponsored prayer at graduation violated the First Amendment. The case involved a Rhode
Island school district’s practice of inviting members of the clergy to provide the invocation
at graduation. In 1986, the Weisman family contacted the school district to lodge a
complaint that a Baptist minister’s prayer at their daughter’s middle school graduation
was unconstitutional. Three years later, while preparing for their younger daughter’s
graduation, Daniel Weisman contacted school officials to ensure that this practice would
not happen again. The principal assured the Weismans that they didn’t have to worry
since “we’ve got a rabbi this year.”19 However, the Weismans, who were Jewish, did not
want any form of prayer at graduation. Vivian Weisman stated, “We see prayer in public
schools…as being very divisive. It really cuts out the minorities for whom the public school
system has been a gateway for full inclusion in our society…. No one should feel like they
are outside of things at their own graduation.”20 The Weismans sought injunctive relief in
federal court to block the rabbi’s prayer from taking place, but the court denied the
request. At the graduation ceremony, the rabbi recited a formulaic prayer adapted from a
pamphlet called “Guidelines for Civic Occasions,” which recommended nonsectarian
themes for public prayer that would presumably pass constitutional muster.21
Engel v. Vitale, 10 N.Y.2d 174, 182 (N.Y. 1961).
Engel, 370 U.S. at 431.
16 School Dist. of Abington Tp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226–27 (1963).
17 Id. at 226.
18 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992).
19 DRIVER, supra note 12, at 382.
20 Id. at 383.
21 Weisman, 505 U.S. at 588.
14
15
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The Supreme Court disagreed. Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the majority, held
that the rabbi’s prayer at graduation violated the Establishment Clause because the
principal’s decision to bring in a religious leader to perform a prayer at graduation made
the choice “attributable to the State.”22 In line with its earlier decisions, the Court
expressed concern with the coercive effect school-sponsored prayer would have on
impressionable young students:
Our decisions in Engel [and Schempp] recognize…[that] prayer exercises in
public schools carry a particular risk of indirect coercion. The concern may
not be limited to the context of schools, but it is most pronounced there….
What to most believers may seem nothing more than a reasonable request
that the nonbeliever respect their religious practices, in a school context
may appear to the nonbeliever or dissenter to be an attempt to employ the
machinery of the State to enforce a religious orthodoxy.23
In his dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia distinguished Weisman from Engel and Schempp,
pointing out that unlike the other prayers at issue, this graduation prayer took place only
once a year outside the classroom at an event that did not require student attendance. 24
However, the Court reasoned that “to say a teenage student has a real choice not to attend
her . . . graduation is formalistic in the extreme.” 25 The First Amendment “forbids the
State to exact religious conformity from a student as the price of attending her own . . .
graduation. This is the calculus the Constitution demands.”26
Along with prayer led by school officials and religious leaders, the Supreme Court would
rule that student-led prayers may violate the Establishment Clause in certain
circumstances as well. In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe (2000), the
Supreme Court held that student-led prayer over the school’s PA system before football
games constituted public speech that violated the Constitution.27 In this case, a high
school in a predominantly white Protestant town in Texas allowed students to select a
classmate to lead a prayer over the school stadium loudspeaker before kickoff at each
home game during the football season.28 A Catholic and a Mormon family filed a lawsuit
against the school district, arguing that the student-led prayer was unconstitutional.29
Key to the case was the centrality of football to the community and the students’ lives. The
federal district court judge in the case remarked that high school football “is the apex of
their social function . . . The entire community turns out for these [games]. And it really
is a big part of these kids’ lives.”30 “I think . . . football is probably a heck of a lot more
Id. at 587.
Id. at 592. In their concurring opinions, two justices noted that they did not see coercion as a
prerequisite to finding an Establishment Clause violation. Id. at 604 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Id. at
609 (Souter, J., concurring).
24 Id. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
25 Id. at 595.
26 Id. at 596.
27 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 301 (2000).
28 Id. at 297–98.
29 Id. at 294.
30 DRIVER, supra note 12, at 389.
22
23
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important [to locals] than graduation.”31 The trial court ordered the school district to
enact a more restrictive policy that allowed only nonsectarian, non-proselytizing prayer,
but the appellate court found that even the modified policy of the district court violated
the Establishment Clause.32
The case went to the Supreme Court, where the majority, led by Justice John Paul Stevens,
determined that the degree of the school’s involvement in the student-led prayer
effectively transformed the prayer into publicly endorsed speech.33 The Court wrote: “The
delivery of such a message—over the school’s public address system, by a speaker
representing the student body, under the supervision of school faculty, and pursuant to a
school policy that explicitly and implicitly encourages public prayer—is not properly
characterized as ‘private’ speech.”34 Even if attendance at games was not required—as it
was for many students, including players, cheerleaders, and school band musicians—the
pregame prayer would reasonably be construed as school-sponsored and coercive in
violation of the Establishment Clause.
B. Free Exercise Issues
In several of the prayer cases, the Supreme Court commented on the tensions between
the Establishment and Free Exercise clauses, noting—as in the Schempp decision—that
these provisions were inextricably intertwined. In a concurring opinion in Wallace v.
Jaffree (1985), in which the Court struck down the Alabama legislature’s requirement of
“one minute of silence” in public schools each morning, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor
wrote:
Government pursues free exercise values when it lifts a governmentimposed burden on the free exercise of religion…When the manifest
objective of a statute is to facilitate the free exercise of religion by lifting a
government-imposed burden…the religious purpose of such a statute is
legitimated by the free exercise clause.35
Lower courts have addressed issues related to employee prayer and the Free Exercise
Clause more directly. In the public school context, courts have held that schools have
broad latitude to regulate the religious practice of employees during working hours,
especially when students are present.36 The courts have consistently ruled against
employees who display overt religious activity during the course of their work. The issue
arises when school employees are seen as acting on behalf of their school during the
course of their official duties. In Roberts v. Madigan (1990), for instance, the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the authority of a school district to order an elementary
school teacher to take down a religious poster from a classroom wall, remove religious
Id.
Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 294.
33 Id. at 310.
34 Id.
35 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 83 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
36 See, e.g., Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d (11th Cir. 1991); Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047 (10th Cir.
1990).
31

32
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books from the classroom, and refrain from silently reading the Bible during instructional
time.37 The court stated that the school needed the authority to prevent potential
violations of the Establishment Clause and to protect students from religious coercion.
The issue becomes murkier, however, when it is unclear whether a school employee is
carrying out religious activity during the course of their official duties or on their own
time. For example, in Wigg v. Sioux Falls School District (2004), a teacher sued the
school district for prohibiting her from serving as an instructor in an evangelical Christian
group for children that met after school hours at various public schools in the district.38
The school district maintained a policy that allowed groups, including outside religious
groups, to use its facilities, provided that they were non-profit organizations with liability
insurance. However, the district also maintained a policy that prohibited all district
personnel from participating in religious activities on school grounds or at schoolsponsored activities.39 The federal district court ruled that the teacher should be able to
participate in the religious group, but that the school district could prohibit her from
participating at the school where she worked.40 The appellate court went further in its
ruling to protect the teacher’s rights, holding that the district could not exclude her from
participating in the group at her own school after hours.41 The court reasoned that once
the school day ended, the teacher became a private citizen, and no reasonable observer
would perceive her after-school involvement in the religious group as a state endorsement
of religion by the school district.42
In sum, therefore, the Supreme Court has consistently held since Engel in 1962 that
schools should not engage in or promote the practice of prayer during school hours and
school-sponsored activities. The holdings in these cases were notably narrow, focusing on
the specific facts at hand and on issues pertaining to the Establishment Clause, school
endorsement of prayer, and the coercion of students. Furthermore, the Supreme Court
and lower courts have struck an uneasy balance between the Establishment Clause and
the Free Exercise Clause with respect to public schools, prohibiting schools from either
endorsing religion or overregulating the private practice of religion outside of regular
school hours. This balancing approach between the First Amendment provisions
constituted the landscape of school prayer jurisprudence for several decades, all the way
up until the Supreme Court’s decision in Kennedy.

Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d at 1059.
Wigg v. Sioux Falls School Dist. 49-5, 274 F.Supp.2d 1084, 1089 (D. S.D. 2003).
39 Id. at 1088.
40 Id. at 1104.
41 Wigg v. Sioux Falls School Dist. 49-5, 382 F.3d 807, 815–16 (8th Cir. 2004).
42 Id. at 815.
37

38
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KENNEDY V. BREMERTON: AN EXPANSION OF EMPLOYEE
FREE EXERCISE RIGHTS?
A. Factual Background and Litigation History

The Kennedy case involved a former Bremerton High School football coach, Joseph
Kennedy, who asserted that his sincerely held Christian beliefs required him to kneel at
the 50-yard line and offer a prayer of thanks immediately after every high school football
game.43 Initially, Kennedy prayed alone on the field, but over the course of more than
seven years, Kennedy routinely invited students, coaches, and members of the public to
join him in prayer. Kennedy also led the football team in prayer in the locker room before
and after games and gave religious-themed motivational speeches.44
The district was first notified that Kennedy was regularly engaging in prayer when an
employee from another school commented positively on the practice to the Bremerton
principal. Motivated by Establishment Clause concerns, the Bremerton School District
notified Kennedy in September 2015 that he was free to engage in private prayer only if it
was non-demonstrative and did not interfere with his job duties.45 The district stated that
in order to resolve the tension between the Establishment Clause and a school employee’s
right to freely exercise their religion, the employee’s free exercise rights “must yield so far
as necessary to avoid school endorsement of religious activities.”46 While Kennedy
initially complied with the district’s directives, in October 2015, he sent a letter through
his counsel to school officials informing them that because of his “sincerely-held religious
beliefs,” he felt “compelled” to offer a “post-game personal prayer” of thanks at midfield.47
Kennedy later spoke to local media and made widely publicized appearances vowing to
resume praying on the field.
After a raucous homecoming game that involved members of the public jumping the fence
to get onto the field and pray with the coach, the school district sent Kennedy another
letter explaining that his conduct violated district policy. The district offered to provide
Kennedy with a private location on campus to pray and invited him to offer his own
suggestions for a compromise.48 Instead of responding to the district, Kennedy and his
attorneys informed the media that the only acceptable outcome was for the school district
to permit him to pray on the 50-yard line after games. After Kennedy continued to
perform post-game prayers, the school district placed Kennedy on paid administrative
leave because he continued to engage in “public and demonstrative religious conduct
while still on duty as an assistant coach.”49

Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 142 S. Ct. 2407, 2416 (2022).
Id.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 2417.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 2418.
49 Id. at 2418–19.
43

44
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Kennedy sued the school district in federal court, claiming that his rights were violated
under the First Amendment’s Free Speech and Free Exercise clauses. Kennedy asked the
trial court to order the school district to reinstate him and allow him to pray as he wished.
The trial court denied his request,50 and a panel of Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals judges
affirmed.51 Kennedy appealed to the Supreme Court, who declined to hear the case in
2019. However, in a concurring opinion signed by three other conservative justices,
Justice Samuel Alito criticized the lower court opinions and suggested that the school
district may have violated the coach’s First Amendment free speech rights.52 Though Alito
concurred in denying review due to “unresolved factual questions,” his sharply worded
rebuke foreshadowed his willingness to revisit the issue of public school employees and
their right to free expression, including religious speech.53 When the case was remanded
to the lower courts for further fact-finding, the district court held that the school district
was justified in restricting Kennedy’s prayer activities to avoid violating the
Establishment Clause.54 Upon review, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals panel once again
ruled against Kennedy55 and the full Ninth Circuit denied rehearing en banc,56 leading to
Kennedy’s second appeal to the Supreme Court.
In September 2021, Kennedy filed another petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme
Court, arguing that the Ninth Circuit wrongly converted “everything public-school
teachers do or say during school hours or after-hours functions into government speech
that the school may prohibit.”57 Kennedy insisted that his “brief, quiet prayer” was simply
private speech, and the school district would not have violated the Establishment Clause
by allowing him to engage in such prayer on the field after games.58 Kennedy urged the
Supreme Court to affirm that the First Amendment “does not demand that schools purge
from the public sphere all that in any way partakes of the religious.”59
The school district responded in turn that Kennedy had mispresented the facts in his
petition. The case was not about the hypothetical question of whether an employee has
the right to a “brief, quiet prayer by himself while at school.”60 Instead, the district
argued:
This case is about a school district’s authority to protect students when its
employee does not work with it to find a reasonable accommodation…The
Id. at 2419.
Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 869 F.3d 813, 831 (9th Cir. 2017).
52 Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 139 S. Ct. 634, 635 (2019) (Alito, J., concurring).
53 Id.
54 Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 443 F.Supp.3d 1223 (W.D. Wash. 2020).
55 Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 991 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2021).
56 Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 4 F.4th 910 (9th Cir. 2021).
57 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., (Sept. 14, 2021),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/21/21418/192354/20210914133417114_FINAL%20Kennedy%20Cert%20Petition.pdf.
58 Id. at 2.
59 Id. at 33.
60 Brief for the Respondent, Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., (2021),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/21/21-418/204295/20211207122626202_21418%20BIO%20final.pdf.
50
51
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district thus faced a stark choice: Either let its employee dictate how school
events would be run—even if that threatened the safety and religious
freedom of the students—or take the steps necessary to curb the practice.61
The school district told the Supreme Court that a ruling for Kennedy would
“overturn decades of settled law under both the Free Speech and
Establishment clauses.”62
B. Oral Arguments Before the Supreme Court
When the case came before the Supreme Court the second time, the Court granted
certiorari on January 14, 2022. During oral arguments on April 25, 2022, the attorneys
and justices focused on the issue of whether the coach’s prayer was a private act that may
be protected by the Free Exercise and Free Speech clauses, or whether the coach prayed
while he was on duty as a public employee of the school district, and thus was subject to
the district’s ability to regulate his speech to avoid violating the Establishment Clause.63
Kennedy’s attorney argued that Kennedy’s prayer was private speech that was protected
by the Free Exercise and Free Speech clauses, and that the lower courts erred in finding
that Kennedy’s prayer was public speech. Kennedy’s attorney stressed that the school
district’s action against Kennedy was solely out of religious endorsement concerns, which
ignored the Court’s precedent affirming that a school does not endorse private religious
speech just because it fails to censure it.64 If the government censures speech solely
because it is religious, Kennedy’s attorney argued, strict scrutiny—the highest standard of
review a court can use to determine whether a government act violated the Constitution—
should apply, rather than any more lenient standard.65
Bremerton School District’s attorney argued that Kennedy was on duty as a public
employee while engaging in prayer. While the school district would permit their
employees to have quiet prayers by themselves even if students could see them, the school
district’s attorney emphasized that in this case, the coach insisted on audible prayers at
the 50-yard line with students, legislators, and other members of the public, even
announcing publicly in the press that these prayers were “how he helps these kids be
better people.”66 Thus, the school district had every right to regulate Kennedy’s prayer.

Id. at 2.
Id. at 17.
63 Transcript of Oral Argument, Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., (2022),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2021/21-418_j4ek.pdf.
64 Id. at 3.
65 Id. at 6.
66 Id. at 57.
61

62
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C. The Supreme Court Decision
1. The Majority Opinion
On June 27, 2022, the Supreme Court issued its ruling in Kennedy.67 In a 6-3 decision
penned by Justice Neil Gorsuch, the conservative majority held that the school district
violated Kennedy’s First Amendment free exercise and free speech rights by disciplining
the coach for “engaging in a . . . personal religious observance.”68 Rejecting the school
district’s argument that the Establishment Clause required it to prohibit Kennedy’s
prayer, Gorsuch wrote: “Respect for religious expressions is indispensable to life in a free
and diverse Republic . . . Here, a government entity sought to punish an individual for
engaging in a brief, quiet, personal religious observance doubly protected by the Free
Exercise and Free Speech clauses of the First Amendment.”69
a. Establishment Clause and Coercion Issues
The Court took issue with the school district’s argument that the district’s interest in
avoiding an Establishment Clause violation outweighed the coach’s free speech and free
exercise rights. During oral arguments, the conservative justices repeatedly criticized the
school district’s reliance on the Establishment Clause, as well as the district’s attempt
during oral argument to raise the issue of the coercive effect of the coach’s conduct on
students.70 Here, the Court formally abandoned the Lemon test that the Court first laid
out in the case Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971),71 in which the Court developed the following
three-part test to analyze whether a government action would violate the Establishment
Clause: 1) whether the government action has a bona fide secular or civic purpose; 2)
whether the primary effect of the government action is neutral, i.e., neither advancing nor
inhibiting religion; and 3) whether the law avoids excessive governmental entanglement
with religion. If the answer to any one of these questions is “no,” then the government
action is deemed unconstitutional.72 In Kennedy, the Court replaced the Lemon test with
an originalist test that would interpret the Establishment Clause by “reference to
historical practices and understandings” so as to “accord with history and faithfully reflect
the understanding of the Founding Fathers.”73
Furthermore, the Court rejected the school district’s argument that the district was
justified in regulating Kennedy’s prayer so that it would not have been guilty of coercing
students to pray. The Court stated that the school district’s own letters to Kennedy never
raised the issue of coercion, despite the fact that a few parents told the district that their
sons had “participated in team prayers only because they did not wish to separate

Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 142 S. Ct. 2407 (2022).
Id. at 2433.
69 Id. at 2432–33.
70 Id. at 2426–27.
71 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
72 Id. at 612–13.
73 Kennedy, 142 S. Ct. at 2428 (quoting Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 576–77 (2014)).
67

68
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themselves from the team.”74 The Court distinguished this case from Lee, in which a clergy
member publicly recited prayers as part of an official school graduation ceremony, 75 and
Santa Fe, in which the school broadcast student prayers over the public address system
before each game.76 Here, the Court remarked, “the prayers for which Mr. Kennedy was
disciplined were not publicly broadcast or recited to a captive audience. Students were
not required or expected to participate.”77
In sum, the Court stated that the district was wrongly attempting to draw a false conflict
between “an individual’s rights under the Free Exercise and Free Speech clauses and its
own Establishment Clause duties.”78 However, “there is no conflict between the
constitutional commands before us. There is only the ‘mere shadow’ of a conflict, a false
choice premised on a misconstruction of the Establishment Clause.” 79 The Court
remarked that a government effort to prohibit any visible religious expression would
undermine a long constitutional tradition in which tolerance of diverse religious
expression is a fundamental part of “learning how to live in a pluralistic society.”80
Notably, the Court interpreted the First Amendment to provide doubled protections for
religious speech in both the Free Exercise and the Free Speech clauses. The Court wrote:
Where the Free Exercise Clause protects religious exercises, whether
communicative or not, the Free Speech Clause provides overlapping
protection for expressive religious activities. That the First Amendment
doubly protects religious speech is no accident. It is a natural outgrowth of
the framers’ distrust of government attempts to regulate religion and
suppress dissent.81
This explicit weighing of both the Free Speech and Free Exercise clauses in favor of
religious expression against the government’s obligation to avoid endorsement under the
Establishment Clause appears to contradict decades of Supreme Court jurisprudence that
analyzed government action in regulating religion by balancing its duties under the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses alone.
b. Free Exercise Issues
Regarding Kennedy’s free exercise claim, the Court determined that Kennedy met his
burden of demonstrating that the school district violated his right to free exercise by
burdening his sincerely motivated religious practice with a policy that was not neutral or
generally applicable. 82 When a plaintiff demonstrates that his rights were infringed under
Id. at 2430.
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 580 (1992).
76 Santa Fe Independent Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 294 (2000).
77 Kennedy, 142 S. Ct. at 2432.
78 Id. at 2432.
79 Id. at 2432 (quoting School Dist. of Abington Tp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 308 (1963) (Goldberg,
J., concurring)).
80 Id. at 2431 (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 590).
81 Id. at 2421 (citations omitted).
82 Id. at 2421–23 (citing Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
879–81 (1990).
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the Free Speech and Free Exercise clauses, strict scrutiny is triggered, and the government
must demonstrate that its action was justified by a compelling state interest and was
narrowly tailored in pursuit of that interest.83 In this case, the Court found that Kennedy’s
prayer was sincerely motivated, and that the district failed to act pursuant to a neutral
and generally applicable rule, since the district’s policy towards Kennedy was specifically
directed at his religious practice while permitting secular post-game conduct by
employees (such as taking personal phone calls).84 Thus, the Court determined that the
school district violated the coach’s free exercise rights.
c. Free Speech Issues
The Court also determined that Kennedy demonstrated that the school district violated
his right to free speech. The Court stated that the government needs to find a balance
between avoiding infringing on the freedom of speech of its employees, on the one hand,
and being able to regulate the speech of employees when they are speaking on the
government’s behalf, on the other. The Court employed a two-step Pickering-Garcetti
analysis, taken from its previous decisions in Pickering v. Township High School85 and
Garcetti v. Ceballos86, to determine whether the school district violated Kennedy’s free
speech rights. First, did Kennedy offer his prayers in his capacity as a private citizen
addressing a matter of public concern, or did his prayers constitute speech occurring
“ordinarily within the scope” of his duties as coach, and thus amount to government
speech attributable to the district?87 If the latter, then the employee is generally not
shielded from the employer’s control and discipline. If the former, the Court would then
apply a nuanced balancing test, in which the government may seek to prove that its
interests as employer outweigh the employee’s interest in speaking privately on a matter
of public concern.88
Under this two-part test, the Court determined that Kennedy’s prayer in fact constituted
private speech, given both the content (the prayer itself) and the timing and
circumstances (post-game period when coaches and students were free to briefly attend
to personal matters).89 The Court stated that Kennedy’s prayer was private speech
because it was made outside of his coaching duties, he was not instructing or coaching
players at the time, and all coaches appeared to be off the clock during this post-game
period.90 With the Court determining that Kennedy was speaking as a private citizen on a
matter of public concern, the burden shifted to the school district to show that it had a
compelling reason to restrict Kennedy’s speech.91 The Court found that the school district
did not establish a compelling reason, given that the district never endorsed Kennedy’s
speech, and the Establishment Clause is not automatically violated whenever a school
Id. at 2422 (citing Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993)).
Id. at 2423.
85 Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cty., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
86 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
87 Kennedy, 142 S. Ct. at 2424 (quoting Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 240 (2014)).
88 Id. at 2423.
89 Id. at 2424–25.
90 Id. at 2425.
91 Id. at 2426.
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fails to censor religious speech.92 Moreover, per the record, there was no evidence of
coercion of students to join the prayer.93 Based on this analysis, the Court concluded that
the school district had violated Kennedy’s freedom of speech when it prohibited him from
praying midfield after games.94
2. The Dissenting Opinion
In a blistering dissent joined by Justices Stephen Breyer and Elena Kagan, Justice Sonia
Sotomayor rebuked Gorsuch’s characterization of the coach’s prayer as “brief, quiet, [and]
personal” and thus meriting First Amendment protections.95 Instead, Justice Sotomayor
wrote:
This case is about whether a public school must permit a school official to
kneel, bow his head, and say a prayer at the center of a school event. The
Constitution does not authorize, let alone require, public schools to embrace
this conduct. Since Engel v. Vitale, this Court consistently has recognized
that school officials leading prayer is constitutionally impermissible.
Official-led prayer strikes at the core of our constitutional protections for
the religious liberty of students and their parents, as embodied in both the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment.96
Elsewhere, Justice Sotomayor reframed the issue of the case as “not about the limits on
an individual’s ability to engage in private prayer at work,” but “about whether a school
district is required to allow one of its employees to incorporate a public, communicative
display of the employee’s personal religious beliefs into a school event, where that display
is recognizable as part of a longstanding practice of the employee ministering religion to
students as the public watched.”97
Asserting that the majority misrepresented not only the issue but the very facts of the
case, Justice Sotomayor summarized the record in detail including: photos of Kennedy
praying while surrounded by his players and members of the public to show that the coach
had led student athletes in “highly visible and demonstrative prayer” at the 50-yard line
for years; evidence that this incited “severe disruption” to school events; concerned letters
from parents about students who felt forced to take part in the prayers; and a media storm
prompted in part by the coach’s outreach to local news outlets.98 Justice Sotomayor also
emphasized the fact that the district did not ban the coach from praying but had in fact
informed Kennedy that “all District staff are free to engage in religious activity, including
prayer, so long as it does not interfere with job responsibilities.”99
Id. at 2426, 2428.
Id. at 2429.
94 Id. at 2432.
95 Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
96 Id. at 2434 (citations omitted).
97 Id. at 2241.
98 Id. at 2436.
99 Id. at 2434.
92
93

Fall 2022

Illinois Employee Relations Report

15

More broadly, the dissenting justices took issue with the majority paying “almost
exclusive attention” to the Free Exercise Clause’s protection of the coach’s religious
expression at the expense of the Establishment Clause’s prohibition of state endorsement
of religion.100 Justice Sotomayor highlighted the Court’s historical vigilance in monitoring
public schools’ compliance with the Establishment Clause due to the central role public
schools play in society and the state’s exertion of “great authority and coercive power”
over children in schools, particularly through their teachers and coaches who serve as role
models.101 Justice Sotomayor determined that the district’s directive prohibiting
Kennedy’s speech was narrowly tailored to avoid an Establishment Clause violation, and
that the district’s Establishment Clause concerns were valid and satisfied strict scrutiny.
Justice Sotomayor warned that this decision—along with Justice Gorsuch’s replacement
of the Lemon test with a vague test based on “history and tradition”—would upend
decades of Court holdings that school officials leading prayer is constitutionally
impermissible.102 In concluding, Justice Sotomayor stated that the Kennedy decision
“elevates one individual’s interest in personal religious exercise, in the same exact time
and place of that individual’s choosing, over society’s interest in protecting the separation
between church and state, eroding the protections for religious liberty for all.”103
IV.

POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS OF KENNEDY FOR PUBLIC SCHOOL
DISTRICTS

There is no doubt that religion and, more specifically, religion in schools “possesses
perhaps an unrivaled ability to stir passions . . .”104 It is also true that, for a time, Supreme
Court decisions balancing student and employee rights under the Establishment Clause
and the Free Exercise Clause provided for a settling of the law in this area and a
corresponding relative calm within public school districts regarding the role of religion in
public classrooms, school buildings and school activities.105 That moment of calm may
have passed. Across the country, a wave of discontent regarding teaching, curriculum and
books in school libraries has arisen.106 School districts are seeing many of these conflicts

Id.
Id. at 2442.
102 Id. at 2449.
103 Id. at 2453.
104 DRIVER, supra note 12 at 380.
105 Professor Driver makes a compelling case that allowing space for religious prayer through moments of
silence, along with the trifecta of—(1) the passage of the Federal Equal Access Act, (2) the acceptance by
states and corresponding increase in the rate of homeschooling, and (3) the legalization of school
vouchers—have resulted in a lowering of the collective temperature on fights over religion in school. Id. at
395-422.
106 See, e.g., Laura Meckler and Hannah Natanson, New Critical Race Theory Laws Have Teachers
Scared, Confused and Self-Censoring, WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 14, 2022),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2022/02/14/critical-race-theory-teachers-fear-laws/;
Melissa Block, Teachers Fear the Chilling Effect of Florida’s So-Called ‘Don’t Say Gay’ Law, NPR (Mar.
30, 2022), https://www.npr.org/2022/03/30/1089462508/teachers-fear-the-chilling-effect-of-floridasso-called-dont-say-gay-law.
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motivated by parents’ faith-based beliefs.107 With the Kennedy decision, the Supreme
Court has waded into this moment of unrest and has largely upended the previously
struck balance.108
The Kennedy decision compels public school districts to review their policies and
procedures governing the religious expression of their employees while on the job, and
potentially that of students as well. The decision made clear that a “neutral and generally
applicable” policy must be applied when restricting the conduct of public employees and
may not single out religious expression for discipline. 109 However, school districts and
public employers still need to balance free speech and free exercise with Establishment
Clause concerns, though Justice Gorsuch’s opinion did not elaborate on an explicit test
for determining whether a public institution violates the Establishment Clause based on
a “historical” analysis. The question is, beyond ensuring that policies and procedures
reflect current law, how should school districts should navigate this uncertain terrain and
resolve issues regarding religious expression as they arise at the local level.
As an initial matter, it is clear that each case will need to involve a fact-specific, case-bycase inquiry using some of the guideposts laid out in the decision. This is certainly made
more complicated by the fact that the majority and the dissent do not agree on the facts
of the Kennedy case itself.110 Ultimately, what is clear is that although the previous
balance tipped towards the Establishment Clause, offering less deference to an educator’s
religious expression than they enjoy outside the school building and on non-working
time, the Court’s decision in Kennedy has elevated the right to free exercise and,
concomitantly, religious free speech, thereby making it difficult for schools to limit private
religious expression on the job, particularly when staff are not actively engaged in carrying
out their duties.

See, e.g., Samuel Smith, Student Gets Religious Accommodation to High School’s Sex Ed Requirement,
THE CHRISTIAN POST (Feb. 4, 2021), https://www.christianpost.com/news/student-gets-religiousaccommodation-to-school-sex-ed-program.html.
108 Some have argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in Carson v. Makin will have a far greater impact
in the long term, channeling public funds to private religious schools that teach lessons antithetical to
secular, mainstream curriculum. See, e.g., Adam Laats, The Supreme Court Has Ushered in a New Era of
Religion at School, THE ATLANTIC (July 15, 2022),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/07/supreme-court-religion-schools-prayer-kennedycarson/661365/.
109 Kennedy, 142 S. Ct. at 2423.
110 Compare id. at 2415 (stating that Mr. Kennedy “offered his prayers quietly while his students were
otherwise occupied”) with id. at 2436 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Kennedy led a prayer out loud,
holding up a player’s helmet as the players kneeled around him”).
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While the Court’s decision in Kennedy has not specifically authorized educators to
introduce prayer during class time, it leaves open more ground for “private prayer” in
other ways and in other spaces.
Let us say a school district allows teachers to decorate their desks in the classroom with
personal items. Teachers have included on their desk pictures and mementos, and one or
two teachers have included inspirational quotes from educator John Dewey and civil
rights leader Mahatma Gandhi. A teacher then decides to place a picture and quote of
Jesus Christ on her desk. Can the school district ask her to remove this from her desk?
When we add that this is a second-grade classroom and students regularly come to the
desk to speak with the teacher, does that change the inquiry? And if the school district
wants her to remove the picture of Jesus Christ, in order to do so are they compelled to
require the teachers to remove the quotes from Mr. Dewey and Mr. Gandhi?
To raise another example, what if a teacher offers optional test preparation for students,
on her own time, after school and not at the direction of the district, and requires that
students pray at the beginning of the tutorial?111 Perhaps because this is so closely aligned
to her duties as a teacher, the school district can more easily restrict the prayer, but there
is certainly room within the reasoning of the Kennedy decision for a contrary outcome.
Likely the best answer is to prohibit this type of quasi-work activity from the start to avoid
the possible conflict and make any such support to students offered through the school.
What both of these examples implicate—perhaps even more than the concern about
public endorsement of religion—is the coercive impact that such religious display may
have on school-aged children. In a concurrence in a case concerning the Equal Access Act
that predated his majority opinion in Lee, Justice Kennedy reminded the Court that any
inquiry related to coercion “must be undertaken with sensitivity to the special
circumstances that exist in a secondary school where the line between voluntary and
coerced participation may be difficult to draw.”112 Indeed, Justice Sotomayor in her
dissenting opinion in Kennedy notes that, prior to the current decision, the Supreme
Court had been “particularly vigilant in its monitoring of compliance with the
Establishment Clause in elementary and secondary schools” given the role of public
schools in our society and the higher risk of coercion given the mandatory nature of school
attendance of young children who are more susceptible to subtle coercive pressure,
particularly from respected adults in the school building.113 Thus, the prior guiding
principle was that the vulnerable and captive nature of the elementary and secondary
school population necessitated a particular and enhanced attention to the potential
coercive impact of religious expression in schools.

LAATS, supra note 108.
Bd. of Educ. of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens By and Through Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 258
(1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
113 Kennedy, 142 S. Ct. at 2442 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578,
583–84 (1987)). In the context of free exercise claims, the Seventh Circuit has also noted that teachers at
the elementary and secondary level are not given expansive academic freedom in the classroom because
the attendance of the students who are subject to that speech is compulsory. Mayer v. Monroe Coty.
Comm. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 479–80 (7th Cir. 2007).
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In his majority opinion in Kennedy, however, Justice Gorsuch dismissed these coercion
concerns on the grounds that there was no direct evidence of coercion in the record and
that the district had not advanced this theory. While legal decisions should certainly not
be made based on mere speculation,114 the unique nature of compulsory education of
young children, as Justice Sotomayor points out, begs the question as to how a school
district “proves” a coercive impact on students. It may be difficult if not impossible to
gauge the impact that an educator’s “private” religious speech within a school has on the
young children under her supervision. Prior to this decision, school districts erred on the
side of protecting students against such coercion, assuming that certain religious activity
on the part of staff would invariably present the risk of such coercion. The Kennedy
decision largely removes the legal right of districts to make such determinations without
specific evidence of a widespread coercive impact.
The majority opinion also urges that “learning how to tolerate speech or prayer of all kinds
is ‘part of learning how to live in a pluralistic society,’ a trait of character essential to ‘a
tolerant citizenry.’”115 Justice Gorsuch asserts that secondary students are mature enough
not to be coerced to participate in religious practice, and that taking offense at such
religious expression does not equate coercion. 116 Indeed, one can hardly argue that
tolerance and acceptance of difference are critical to teach to young people. One may
question, perhaps, whether allowing religious activity of educators within the school
setting will teach students that lesson. When an educator who practices the majority faith
of the community engages in religious activity in school, will a student who practices a
minority faith receive solely a lesson on tolerance, or perhaps more likely, will that student
feel both a sense of alienation and the pressure to join in?
Finally, taking a perhaps more troubling example, can a public school require an educator
to use the chosen name and pronouns of a transgender student if doing so violates their
own religious beliefs?117 Perhaps the answer remains unaffected by the Kennedy decision
insofar as if this happens in the classroom, the teacher is carrying out her official duties,
and the school district can impose its rules (and corresponding discipline for violations of
such rules) on the teacher. However, the Supreme Court’s elevation of free exercise rights
in Kennedy raises many questions and the specter of further entanglement and
encroachment of religion within public schools. Particularly in communities where
religion plays a dominant role, the legal rails that prevented religion in these school
systems may have been weakened or removed entirely.
Before Kennedy, there existed a balance, however uneasy, of religious rights within public
school districts across this country based on the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses.
The Kennedy decision, however, has introduced a new playing field. School districts are
As with many of the facts in this case, whether there was a coercive impact of Coach Kennedy’s speech
was hotly contested between the majority and dissenting opinions.
115 Kennedy, 142 S. Ct. at 2429 (citing Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 590 (1992)).
116 Id.
117 Matt Barnum, What Will the Supreme Court Decision on Prayer Mean for Schools?, CHALKBEAT (June
27, 2022), https://www.chalkbeat.org/2022/6/27/23185586/supreme-court-schools-prayer-footballcoach.
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cautioned to review and revise any policies, procedures and practices that are not
neutrally applied to religious expression, limit any “free time” when staff can engage in
religious expression, and continue to protect all staff and students of all faiths from
discrimination, harassment and bullying. If a matter does arise where a school district
believes an employee’s religious expression may not be protected, school districts need to
document the facts of the situation, obtain expert guidance on whether there is a coercive
influence on students of the religious expression at issue, and then analyze the situation
according to the Court’s guidance with the assistance of legal counsel.

